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1. Introduction. 
 
What the last years have witnessed is a gradual – albeit discontinuous – watering down of EU-wide 
precautionary risk governance, and a greater emphasis being placed on evidence-based regulation; in 
other words, the rise of the latter “soul” of EU risk regulation1 has ultimately caused the former to 
shrink. A precautionary approach to the governance of uncertain public health and environmental 
risks postulates a prudential risk assessment,2 whereby due consideration is given to the relevant 
margins of scientific uncertainty. The risk manager shall then take into account the results of the risk 
assessment phase, the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle3 and any other legitimate 
factors (“OLFs”) at stake;4 against this backdrop, the risk manager is called upon to politically weigh 
and balance all relevant interests and identify the intended level of public health and environmental 
protection. Evidence-based risk regulation, on the other hand, is grounded on a positivist approach to 
science; this paradigm privileges a more circumscribed focus on what science has proved and 
established, and postulates a thorough scrutiny of the soundness of the scientific evidence 
substantiating regulatory measures.5 
Unsurprisingly, the case law of the CJEU in this field is inconsistent and rather erratic.6 On the one 
hand, the Court’s rulings have traditionally adhered to a procedural standard of review.7 On the other 
                                                     
1 On the “dual” nature of EU risk regulation, and on the coexistence of an “evidence-based” and “precautionary” soul 
therein, see Alemanno, “Case C-79/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Servicos Lda v. Ministero della Salute, Judgment 
of the Court of Justice (Second Chamber) of 22 December 2010” 48 CML Rev (2011) 1329, 1329-1330; and Alemanno, 
“Risk Versus Hazard and The Two Souls of EU Risk Regulation: A Reply to Ragnar Lofstedt” 2 EJRR 169, 169-170. 
2 On the notion of “prudential” risk assessment, and the – arguably, formalistic – distinction between “prudential” risk 
assessment and “precautionary” risk management, see COM(2000) 1 Final, Communication from the Commission on the 
Precautionary Principle, p. 12, section 5. 
3 See COM(2000) 1 Final, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 2, at 12, stating 
that the precautionary principle shall apply “when scientific uncertainty precludes a full assessment of the risk and when 
decision-makers consider that the chosen level of environmental protection or of human, animal and plant health may be in 
jeopardy”; at 13, section 5.1., on the appreciation of scientific uncertainty; and at 16, section 6.2., on the triggering factor for 
the application of the precautionary principle. See also Recitals (8) and (21) and Articles 5(1) and 7(1) of Regulation (EC) 
No. 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 Laying Down the General Principles and 
Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of 
Food Safety, O.J. 2002, L 31, the General Food Law (hereafter, “GFL”). Article 7(1) maintains that “In specific 
circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, the possibility of harmful effects [on health] is 
identified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of 
[health] protection chosen in the Community may be adopted […]”. 
4 Notably, in this perspective, see recital (19) and articles 5, 6(2), 6(3) and 7(2) of the GFL, supra note 3. Article 6(3) 
maintains that “risk management shall take into account the results of risk assessment […], other factors legitimate to the 
matter under consideration, and the precautionary principle where the conditions laid down in article 7(1) are relevant 
[…]”. 
5 For a detailed account see infra, section 5., and particularly notes 199 and 200. 
6 For the same view, see Janssen and Van Asselt, “The Precautionary Principle in Court. An Analysis of Post-Pfizer Case 
Law”, in Van Asselt, Versluis and Vos (eds.), Balancing Between Trade and Risk. Integrating Legal and Social Science 
Perspectives (Routledge, 2013), pp. 197-200; Dąbrowska Klosinska, “Risk, Precaution And Scientific Complexity Before 
2 
 
hand, the post-Pfizer8 partial “scientification” of the Court’s review9 has resulted in the coexistence of 
different strands of case law, along the continuum spanning from a deferential standard of scrutiny, to 
a more thorough and intrusive review of the scientific evidence relied upon.  
Bilbaína is peculiar because of its structural ambiguity: a close look at this case testifies that it 
deserves special attention. Do the General Court and the Court of Justice in this case focus on the 
Commission’s duty to take “all relevant factors” into account in the decision-making process, or do 
they rather scrutinise the scientific soundness of the assessment methodology applied? Is the standard 
of review deployed in the case under comment an authentically procedural one? If the Commission 
complied with its procedural obligations, as laid out by the General Court and the Court of Justice, 
would it still be in a position to enact the same precautionary categorisation? And, crucially, does this 
case epitomise a latent shift away from a procedural review10 of the Commission’s duty of good 
administration, to a substantive review11 of the Commission’s duty to adhere to an evidence-based 
model of risk regulation?  
 
 
2. The Factual and Legal Background. 
 
As expressly acknowledged in the Opinion of the Advocate General12 and in the Judgment of the 
Court of Justice,13 a range of highly complex technical-scientific matters lie at the heart of this case. 
In case T-689/1314 the eighteen applicants – suppliers or downstream users of “pitch, coal tar, high-
temperature” (EC No. 266-028-2, hereafter, “CTPHT”) – successfully challenged the Commission’s 
classification of CTPHT as an Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) substance.15 
The aquatic toxicity level of CTPHT had been assessed and categorised in accordance with the 
provisions of Regulation 1272/2008 on the Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and 
Mixtures (hereafter, “CLP Regulation”);16 the applicants in the case were market actors facing a range 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the Court of Justice of the European Union”, in Gruszczynski and Werner (eds.), Deference In International Courts and 
Tribunals (OUP, 2014), p. 208; Janssen and Rosenstock, “Handling Uncertain Risks: An Inconsistent Application of 
Standards?” 7 EJRR (2016) 144, 146 and 154. 
7 Inter alia, see Case C-77/09, Gowan Comércio International e Servicos LDA v. Ministero della Salute, EU:C:2010:803; 
Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited v. Secretary of State for Transport, EU:C:2010:419; and Case T-333/10, ATC and 
Others v. Commission, EU:T:2013:451 – despite the Court’s decision that the initial ban manifestly disregarded the limits of 
the Commission’s discretion for specific procedural reasons. Looking at less recent case law, see Case C-68/86, United 
Kingdom v. Council, EU:C:1988:85; Case C-331/88, Ex Parte Fedesa and Others, EU:C:1990:391; Case C-405/92, 
Établissements Armand Mondiet SA v. Armement Islais SARL, EU:C:1993:906; Case C-157/96, Ex Parte National Farmers' 
Union and Others, EU:C:1998:91; Case C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Commission, EU:C:1998:192; Joined Cases C-154 
and C-155/04, Ex Parte Alliance for Natural Health and Others v. Secretary of State for Health, EU:C:2005:449. On the 
Court’s – originally – deferential standard of review, see also Vos, “The European Court of Justice in the Face of Scientific 
Uncertainty and Complexity”, in Dawson, De Witte and Muir (eds.), Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice 
(Edward Elgar, 2013), pp. 145-149. 
8 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council, EU:T:2002:209. 
9 For the same view see Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (Edward Elgar, 2008), pp. 84-87; Vos, op. cit. supra note 7, pp. 152 
ff.; Dąbrowska Klosinska, op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 205 ff.; Anderson, “Contrasting Models of EU Administration in Judicial 
Review of Risk Regulation” 51 CML Rev (2014) 424, 432 ff. 
10 That is, a procedural review of the Commission’s duty to take “all relevant factors” into consideration in the application 
of the summation method – see infra, sections 3. and 4.1. 
11 That is, a substantive review of the scientific soundness of the Commission’s decision to use the summation method – see 
infra, sections 3. and 4.1. 
12 Opinion, paras. 1, 62 and 79. 
13 Judgment, paras. 43 and 44. 
14 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, EU:T:2015:762. 
15 For a definition of “Acute Aquatic Toxicity”, see Regulation (EC) No. 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 2008 on the Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures, Amending and 
Repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and Amending Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006, O.J. 2008, L 353 
(hereafter, “CLP Regulation”), Annex I, point 4.1.1.1.(a); for a definition of “Chronic Aquatic Toxicity”, see Annex I, point 
4.1.1.1.(g). 
16 Supra note 15. 
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of procedural burdens and economic costs, as a result of the Commission’s classification of CTPHT.17 
This substance is a residue from the distillation of high-temperature coal tar,18 used in the 
manufacturing of aluminium, carbon, graphite and steel.19 Crucially, it is among the substances of 
unknown or variable composition, complex reaction products or biological materials, defined as 
“UVCB substances”;20 in other words, CTPHT cannot be straightforwardly identified by its chemical 
composition.  
Back in 2010, pursuant to Article 37 of the CLP Regulation,21 the Netherlands had submitted a 
technical dossier to the European Chemicals Agency (hereafter, “ECHA”)22 proposing that CTPHT 
should be classified as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance.23 Upon the submission 
of comments and observations by all concerned parties, the dossier was forwarded to the ECHA Risk 
Assessment Committee;24 one year later the latter adopted its own opinion,25 confirming the proposal 
of the Netherlands. On these grounds the Commission enacted Regulation (EU) No. 944/2013 of 2 
October 2013,26 classifying CTPHT as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance.27  
The applicants sought the partial annulment of the Regulation, alleging in their three pleas in law, 
respectively, a breach of the REACH Regulation,28 a breach of the CLP Regulation and an 
infringement of the principle of equal treatment; a manifest error of assessment; and a breach of the 
principle of transparency and of the rights of defence.29  
In its Judgment, the General Court devoted special attention to the second part of the second plea in 
law,30 whereby the applicants lamented a manifest error of assessment as a result of the Commission’s 
choice to use and apply the summation method for the assessment of CTPHT’s toxicity for aquatic 
organisms.  
The Netherlands and the ECHA Risk Assessment Committee had concurred in the view that the 
aquatic toxicity of CTPHT could not be effectively assessed through the Water Accommodated 
                                                     
17 See the labelling and packaging requirements laid out in the CLP Regulation, supra note 15; as well as the obligations set 
out in Article 3 and Annex III of Directive 2008/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 
on the Inland Transport of Dangerous Goods, O.J. 2008, L 260.  
18 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, paras. 1 to 8, quoting the CLP 
Regulation, supra note 15, Annex VI, Tables 3.1. and 3.2.  
19 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, paras. 1 to 8. 
20 Ibid. 
21 CLP Regulation, supra note 15. 
22 See Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), Establishing a European Chemicals Agency 
(ECHA), amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 793/93 and Commission Regulation 
(EC) No. 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 
93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, O.J. 2006, L 396 (hereafter, “REACH Regulation”). 
23 As well as a Carcinogenic 1A (H350), Mutagenic 1B (H340) and Toxic for Reproduction (H360FD) substance; Case T-
689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 3. 
24 Article 76(1)(c) REACH Regulation, supra note 22. 
25 On the grounds of a detailed technical analysis, referred to in Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. 
European Commission as “background document”, and of a document listing the specific answers of the Netherlands to any 
observations on its technical dossier. See Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, 
para. 6. 
26 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 944/2013 of 2 October 2013 Amending, for the Purposes of its Adaptation to Technical 
and Scientific Progress, Regulation (EC) No. 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2008 on Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures, O.J. 2013, L 261.  
27 See Article 1(2)(a)(i) and Article 1(2)(a)(ii) and Annexes II and IV of Commission Regulation (EU) No. 944/2013, supra 
note 26. 
28 Supra note 22. 
29 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 18. 
30 In the other three parts of their second plea in law the applicants submitted a manifest error of assessment, respectively, in 
so far as UV irradiation testing was required, without having standardised test methods established and without taking 
account of the inert inherent properties of CTPHT; in so far as the classification and multiplication factors for the single 
components of CTPHT were included in the dossier on CTPHT, rather than in separate ad hoc dossiers;  and in so far as the 
studies and information provided by the applicants had not been taken into account. See Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de 
Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 20. 
4 
 
Fraction (hereafter, “WAF”) approach, advocated by the applicants.31 For this reason, the Netherlands 
and the ECHA Committee both opted for the application of the – alternative – summation method;32 
this postulates that the relevant substance is regarded as a mixture, and that the single constituents are 
analysed separately in accordance with their aquatic toxicity effects.33 Thus, the 16 polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbon (hereafter, “PAH”) constituents of CTPHT were the object of a separate 
assessment:34 CTPHT was accordingly classified as a (H400) and (H410) substance. It is worth noting 
that the summation method is liable to provide an overestimation of the aquatic toxicity of a mixture: 
analysing the level of water solubility and availability to aquatic organisms (bioavailability) of every 
single toxic chemical constituent gives an overview of the worst case scenario.35 However, and 
conversely, the assessment of UVCB substances as a whole – as advocated by the eighteen applicants 
– is in fact likely to result in an underestimation of their aquatic toxicity; indeed, scientific uncertainty 
persists as to the behaviour of the single toxic constituents of UVCB substances once in contact with 
water.36 
In the second part of the second plea in law the eighteen applicants claimed that the Commission had 
disregarded that the 16 PAH components, when bound together in CTPHT, have a very low level of 
water solubility and a low level of bioavailability; hence, the applicants maintained that the 
Commission had manifestly erred in its assessment of CTPHT’s level of aquatic toxicity.  
The General Court concurred with them, ruling that the Commission had committed a manifest error 
of assessment by failing “to comply with its obligation to take into consideration all the relevant 
factors and circumstances”.37 Specifically, the General Court maintained that neither the Commission 
nor the ECHA had been able to establish that, in basing their classification of CTPHT “on the 
assumption that all of the PAHs present in that substance dissolved in the water phase and were thus 
available to aquatic organisms, [they had taken] into consideration the fact that, according to point 
1.3. of the [Risk Assessment Committee’s] background document […], the constituents of CTPHT 
were released from CTPHT only to a limited extent, and that the substance was very stable”.38 
Moreover, the General Court added that the Commission had manifestly erred in its presumption that 
the 16 PAH constituents – representing 9.2% of the CTPHT mixture – could all dissolve in water, 
disregarding the finding that the maximum rate of water solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance is 
0.0014%.39 
Against this background, the General Court concluded that the Commission had incorrectly applied 
the summation method, and had manifestly erred in its assessment of CTPHT’s toxicity to aquatic 
organisms; accordingly, it partially annulled Commission Regulation (EU) No. 944/2013 of 2 October 
2013, in so far as it classified CTPHT as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance.  
In case C-691/15 P the Commission, supported by the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, sought to 
have the Judgment of the General Court set aside; the Commission submitted three grounds of appeal. 
                                                     
31 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 7. 
32 As laid out in Annex I, part 1, of the CLP Regulation, supra note 15. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Thus, upon attributing a coefficient factor to all PAHs, the results of the multiplications were summed up to identify the 
level of aquatic toxicity of the CTPHT mixture. See Annex I, part 1, of the CLP Regulation, supra note 15. 
35 See infra, section 4.2. and 4.3. 
36 See infra, section 4.2. and 4.3. 
37 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 30. At para. 24 of the Judgment 
the General Court – quoting Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited v. Secretary of State for Transport, para. 34, and Case 
T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), EU:T:2013:106, para. 77 – 
maintains that “the EU authorities which have adopted the act must be able to show before the EU Courts that, in adopting 
the act, they actually exercised their discretion, which presupposes the taking into consideration of all the relevant factors 
and circumstances of the situation that the act [is] intended to regulate”. Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited, in turn, 
referred to Case C-310/04 Spain v. Council, EU:C:2006:521, at para. 122. For a more detailed overview of this point see 
infra, section 4.1. 
38 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 32. 
39 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 34. 
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In the first ground, the Commission claimed that the General Court had violated its duty to state 
reasons – enshrined in Articles 36 and 53 of the Statute of the CJEU.40 The Commission contended 
that the decision is vitiated by a lack of reasoning, in so far as the arguments of the General Court are 
ambiguous and inherently contradictory: specifically, the Commission pointed to the fact that the 
Judgment is unclear as to whether the Regulation was partially annulled because of the use of the 
summation method, or because of an error in its application.41 
Drawing on the argument developed in the first ground of appeal, the second ground is structured in 
two parts. In the first part of the second ground of appeal, the Commission alleged an error of law in 
so far as the General Court partially annulled the Regulation because of the Commission’s decision to 
use  the summation method.42 
In the second part of the second ground of appeal,43 alternatively, the Commission alleged an error of 
law in so far as the General Court partially annulled the Regulation because of the Commission’s 
incorrect application of the summation method. In this specific regard the Commission underlined 
that, despite the General Court’s finding that the Commission should have taken account of the 
characteristics of CTPHT as a whole substance in its application of the summation method, the 
choice, use and application of this methodology in fact postulate an analysis of the mixture’s 
components. In this light the General Court’s argument that the Commission should have given due 
consideration to the inert inherent features of CTPHT as a whole substance,44 as well as to its 
0.0014% maximum rate of water solubility,45 is inconsistent with the very use and application of the 
summation method – which postulates the analysis of CTPHT as a mixture, and the calculation of the 
maximum rate of water solubility of its single components. The Commission thus concluded that “it is 
important only to ascertain, using the summation method, whether the thresholds set by the 
Regulation No. 1272/2008 are met, without the Commission having any margins of discretion 
whatsoever in that regard. The General Court therefore erred in law in criticising the Commission for 
not taking into consideration factors that are not prescribed by the summation method […]”.46 
Finally, in its third ground of appeal, the Commission argued that the General Court had exceeded the 
limits of judicial review, going beyond the review of a manifest error of assessment.47 The 
Commission highlighted that it had adopted Regulation (EU) No. 944/2013 on the basis of a broad 
range of scientific evidence, which justified its use and application of the summation method.48 It thus 
argued that the General Court, by picking and choosing the data on the low solubility of CTPHT as a 
whole substance to invalidate the Commission’s classification, had disregarded the rest of the 
available scientific evidence, distorted the evidence in the case and directly substituted its own 
assessment for that of the Commission.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. The Opinion of Advocate General Bobek and the Decision of the Court of Justice. 
 
                                                     
40 See Opinion, para. 30, and Judgment, para. 19. 
41 See Opinion, para. 30, and Judgment, paras. 19 and 20. 
42 Opinion, para. 42, and Judgment, para. 28. 
43 Opinion, paras. 42 and 43, and Judgment, para. 28. 
44 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 32. 
45 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 34. 
46 See the Judgment, para. 30 – reporting the Commission’s argument. 
47 Opinion, paras. 97 and 98, and Judgment, para. 57. 
48 Ibid. 
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In the words of the Advocate General, this case “concerns the reconciliation of complex scientific 
assessments with the requirement of legality of administrative action”;49 the fundamental question of 
law thus attains to the discretion of the Commission “in cases in which the legislation has laid down a 
list of relevant factors to be taken into account in the course of [a technical-scientific] assessment”.50 
The following sub-sections analyse the arguments of the Advocate General and the decision of the 
Court of Justice by specific reference to the three grounds of appeal. 
 
 
3.1. The First Ground of Appeal. 
 
Starting off from an analysis of the first ground of appeal, the Advocate General claimed that the 
decision of the General Court is clear and unequivocal in ruling that the Commission applied the 
summation method in an incorrect manner.51 
The Advocate General specifically focused on the General Court’s finding that the Commission had 
committed a manifest error of assessment by failing to comply with its obligation to take into 
consideration “all the relevant factors and circumstances” – i.e., in this case, the low solubility of 
CTPHT as a whole substance – that would allow it to correctly assess the chemical properties of the 
constituents of CTPHT,52 as mandated by the summation method. Thus, the Advocate General 
inferred, the contested Judgment clearly referred to the Commission’s incorrect application of the 
summation method, rather than to its decision to use it.53  
In this light, the Advocate General argued that the General Court had not breached its duty to state 
reasons.54 The Court of Justice concurred with the views of the Advocate General and rejected this 
ground of appeal as unfounded, arguing that the Judgment of the General Court is clear and 
unequivocal in holding that the Commission manifestly erred in its application of the summation 
method.55 
 
 
3.2. The Second Ground of Appeal. 
 
Building on his Opinion on the first ground of appeal, the Advocate General directly turned to the 
second branch of the second ground of appeal – whereby the Commission alleged an error of law in 
so far as the General Court held that the Commission had incorrectly applied the summation method.56 
To begin with, the Advocate General carefully scrutinised the Commission’s argument. The 
Commission claimed that, when applying the summation method, it had no discretion to take into 
account any evidence other than that provided for in the CLP Regulation.57 Drawing on this premise, 
the Commission argued that it had not committed any error of assessment in the application of the 
                                                     
49 Opinion, para. 1. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Opinion, paras. 30 to 41. 
52 Opinion, paras. 33 and 34. Para. 33, quoting para. 30 of Case T-689/13, refers to the Commission’s failure to “take due 
account of the proportion in which the 16 PAH constituents are present in CTPHT and their chemical effects”. 
53 Opinion, paras. 34 to 40, referring to Case T-689/13, paras. 31 to 34. 
54 Opinion, para. 40. 
55 Judgment, paras. 26 and 27. At para. 22 of the Judgment the Court, quoting Joined Cases C‑ 204/00 P, C‑ 205/00 P, 
C‑ 211/00 P, C‑ 213/00 P, C‑ 217/00 P and C‑ 219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v. Commission, EU:C:2004:6, para. 
372, and Case C‑ 50/17 P, Universidad Internacional de la Rioja v. EUIPO (Order of 1 June 2017, not published) 
EU:C:2017:415, para. 12, maintains that “It follows from settled case‑ law of the Court that the obligation of the General 
Court to state reasons requires it to disclose its reasoning clearly and unequivocally, in such a way as to enable the persons 
concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review”. 
56 Opinion, paras. 42 and 43. 
57 Opinion, para. 44. 
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summation method, as this specific methodology does not allow the Commission to take the overall 
solubility of CTPHT into consideration.58  
The Advocate General noted that, in accordance with the duty of good administration enshrined in 
settled case law, the Commission is under an obligation to take into consideration “all the relevant 
factors and circumstances of the situation which the act [is] intended to regulate”, examining 
“carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case”.59 
The Commission held that the low solubility of CTPHT is not a relevant factor “because the 
summation method does not identify as relevant”;60 moreover, the Commission claimed that it had 
“no discretion to determine what constitutes a relevant factor”61 when applying the summation 
method. Symmetrically, the Advocate General considered the crux of this ground of appeal to lie in 
the relevance of the low solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance, and in the margins of the 
Commission’s discretion in the application of the summation method;62 he thus went on to assess 
“whether solubility as a whole is a relevant factor that must be considered in the context of the 
summation method”,63 and “whether the Commission has any discretion to identify relevant factors 
beyond those listed”64 in the CLP Regulation, taking them into consideration when applying the 
summation method.65 
The Advocate General found that the assessment of the former matter is under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the General Court, which had considered the low aquatic solubility of CTPHT to be a 
“relevant factor”;66 he then turned to an analysis of the latter question, and answered it in the 
affirmative. To begin with, and in general terms, he disagreed with the view that the Commission 
enjoys a broad discretion as regards the choice and use of the appropriate assessment methodology, 
but no discretion at all in its application.67 Building on this premise, the Advocate General developed 
four specific arguments on the Commission’s discretion in the application of the summation method.68  
First,69 he found that the wording of Annex I to the CLP Regulation70 supports the view that all 
available data should be applied, when appropriate, “for the purposes of classifying the aquatic 
environmental hazards of the mixture”.71 Thus, the Advocate General noted that although the CLP 
Regulation72 does not provide for the use of criteria other than those listed in its provisions, it does not 
expressly prohibit the consideration of other factors which may be relevant to the classification 
process.73  
                                                     
58 Opinion, paras. 45 to 50. Further than that, the Commission also claimed that it had not committed any error of assessment 
in assuming that all the PAH components dissolved in water, and that it had in fact taken into account the proportion and the 
chemical effects of all the constituents of CTPHT, in accordance with the summation method. 
59 Opinion, para. 53, “The Commission has an obligation to take into consideration all the relevant factors and circumstances 
of the situation which the act was intended to regulate. That obligation can be clearly traced back through the Court’s case 
law to the more general duty of good administration, which entails a duty of the competent institution to examine carefully 
and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case […]”. In this respect, the Advocate General cites Case 
C‑ 269/90, Technische Universität München, EU:C:1991:438, para. 14; and Case C‑ 505/09 P, Commission v. Estonia, 
EU:C:2012:179, para. 95. See also supra, note 37; for a detailed overview of this point see infra, section 4.1. 
60 Opinion, para. 56. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Opinion, para. 50. 
63 Opinion, para. 54. 
64 Opinion, para. 59. 
65 Opinion, paras. 61 to 95. 
66 See Opinion, para. 55, citing Case C-199/13 P, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group and Others v. Commission (Order of 27 
March 2014), EU:C:2014:205, paras. 33 to 36. See also Opinion, para. 104. 
67 Opinion, para. 66. 
68 Opinion, paras. 73 to 93. 
69 Opinion, paras. 73 to 76, and Judgment, para. 41. 
70 See Annex I, point 4.1.3.1. of Regulation 1272/2008, supra note 15. 
71 Opinion, para. 73, and Judgment, para. 41. 
72 See Annex I, point 4.1.3.5.5. of Regulation 1272/2008, supra note 15. 
73 Opinion, paras. 73 to 75. See also Judgment, para. 39. 
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Secondly,74 and with reference to the broader context and international origins of the CLP 
Regulation,75 he highlighted that the highly complex technical-scientific nature of the processes dealt 
with in the Regulation sheds light on the inherent limits of all methodological criteria, calling for the 
integration and consideration of any other “relevant factors” into the assessment and final 
classification of aquatic toxicity.  
Thirdly,76 he stressed the need to look beyond the individual case: he then went on to underline that 
even though the Commission’s “error of assessment” in this case had resulted in the most severe 
hazard classification, the opposite may occur, and the Commission’s alleged “inability to take into 
account other relevant factors [may] ultimately lead to a lower hazard classification than might 
otherwise be justified”.77 A thorough scrutiny of the Commission’s duty to take “all relevant factors” 
into consideration, he suggested, is of great importance: yet, “if there is indeed discretion, it must be 
accepted that such discretion can cut both ways. If highly important, relevant factors come to light 
that make it appear that a hazard classification is too high, those factors must also be considered as 
part of the main assessment”.78 
Finally,79 the Advocate General made a very brief reference to Case T-93/10 Bilbaína v ECHA80 and 
Appeal Case C-287/13 P.81 Relying on the Court’s finding in Case C-287/13 P that the Commission 
was not precluded from applying the summation method to assess the bioaccumulative properties of 
CTPHT, even though Annex XIII of the REACH Regulation did not expressly provide for the use of 
this assessment methodology, the Advocate General remarked that there is nothing in Annex I to the 
CLP Regulation which precludes the identification of any other “relevant factors” that the 
Commission shall take into consideration. This, the Advocate General suggested, lends support to the 
argument that the Commission had a discretionary power to take all “relevant factors” into account 
when applying the summation method. 
The Advocate General concluded that “as a matter of law, the Commission did have discretion to 
identify other relevant factors in the course of applying the summation method, without breaching the 
CLP Regulation”.82 It thus held that the General Court did not err in law in ruling that the 
Commission had incorrectly applied the summation method, and proposed that the Court should reject 
the second ground of appeal.83  
The Court of Justice concurred with the Advocate General’s Opinion. The Court specifically focused 
on the question “whether the Commission, when it applies the summation method in order to 
determine whether a UVCB substance comes within the categories of chronic or aquatic toxicity, is 
required to limit its assessment solely to the factors expressly referred to in [the CLP Regulation], 
excluding any other factor, or, on the contrary, whether it must, under its duty to act diligently, 
                                                     
74 Opinion, paras. 76 to 80, and Judgment, paras. 42 to 44. 
75 See Opinion, para. 76, where the Advocate General quotes Recital 6 to the CLP Regulation: “This Regulation follows 
various declarations whereby the Community confirmed its intention to contribute to the global harmonisation of criteria for 
classification and labelling, not only at UN level, but also through the incorporation of the internationally agreed GHS 
criteria into Community law”. The Advocate General further remarks that the tiered approach to aquatic hazard classification 
reflects the approach taken at the international level, under the Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling 
of Chemicals (“the GHS”). 
76 Opinion, paras. 81 to 85. 
77 Opinion, para. 81. See also the Opinion, at paras. 83 and 92, and the Judgment, at para. 46. 
78 Opinion, para. 84. 
79 Opinion, paras. 86 to 92. 
80 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), EU:T:2013:106. For a 
more detailed comment on this case see infra, section 4.3. 
81 Case C-287/13 P, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), EU:C:2014:599. For a 
more detailed comment on this case see infra, section 4.3. 
82 Opinion, para. 93. 
83 Opinion, para. 96. 
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examine other factors […]”:84 the “other factors” the Court referred to are of course the inert inherent 
features of CTPHT as a whole substance85, and its 0.0014% maximum rate of water solubility.86 
First, the Court started off by assessing whether the Commission’s discretion was limited in the 
application of the summation method and in the consequent assessment of CTPHT’s aquatic toxicity. 
Relying on the arguments of the Advocate General, the Court concluded that “when it applies the 
summation method […] the Commission is not required to limit its assessment solely to the factors 
expressly referred to in […] Annex I […] to the exclusion of any other factors”:87 rather, and “in 
accordance with its duty to act diligently, the Commission is required to examine carefully and 
impartially other factors which […] are nevertheless relevant”.88 
Secondly, the Court maintained that the question whether the low solubility of CTPHT as a substance 
may be regarded as a “relevant factor” that the Commission should have taken into due consideration 
“is a question of the legal characterisation of facts coming within the jurisdiction of the Court in the 
course of its review in appeal”.89 Drawing on this finding, the Court ruled that the low aquatic 
solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance was in fact a “relevant factor” that the Commission should 
have taken into due consideration.90 
On these grounds, the Court upheld the General Court’s ruling that the Commission had manifestly 
erred in its assessment of the aquatic toxicity of CTPHT, in so far as it had failed to consider the inert 
inherent features of CTPHT as a whole substance91 as well as its 0.0014% maximum rate of water 
solubility.92 Thus, the second ground of appeal was rejected as unfounded.93 
 
 
3.3. The Third Ground of Appeal. 
 
Finally, the Advocate General analysed the third ground of appeal, whereby the Commission argued 
that the General Court had exceeded the limits of judicial review, going beyond the review of any 
manifest error of assessment and directly substituting its own scientific assessment for that of the 
Commission.94 The Advocate General contended that the Commission had relied on an incorrect 
interpretation of the decision,95 and claimed that “the contested Judgment does not say that, if the 
Commission had taken the solubility of CTPHT as a whole into account, it would have inevitably 
trumped all other factors. The General Court concludes only that the Commission committed a 
manifest error of assessment by failing to consider the solubility of CTPHT as a whole”.96 Thus, it 
proposed that the third ground of appeal should also be rejected. 
                                                     
84 Judgment, para. 33. 
85 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 32. 
86 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 34. 
87 Judgment, para. 47. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Judgment, para. 49. For a different view on this point see the Opinion, paras. 55 and 104. 
90 Judgment, paras. 50 to 56.  
91 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 32. 
92 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 34. 
93 Judgment, paras. 54 and 55. 
94 See the Opinion, at para. 97, and the Judgment, at para. 57. 
95 Specifically, when assessing the third ground of appeal, the Advocate General develops three points; for a detailed 
analysis see the Opinion at paras. 102 to 107. 
96 Opinion, para. 107. See also the Opinion, at para. 94: “Moreover, I note that at no point does (or indeed could) the General 
Court hold that if, hypothetically, the Commission had taken the low solubility of CTPHT into account, it would have 
committed a manifest error in going on to classify CTPHT as Aquatic Acute 1 or Aquatic Chronic 1. Rather, it is the 
Commission’s objective failure to take that element into account in its reasoning, as confirmed by the General Court, which 
resulted in the partial annulment of the contested regulation”, commented infra, in section 5. 
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The Court adhered to the interpretation of the Advocate General, and explicitly argued that the third 
ground of appeal is based on “an erroneous reading of the Judgment […]”.97 Specifically, the Court 
contended that the General Court had not substituted its own assessment of the relevant technical-
scientific evidence for that of the Commission, because the General Court’s review had exclusively 
focused “on the procedural question of determining whether the Commission, in classifying CTPHT, 
complied with its obligation to take into consideration all the relevant factors and circumstances”.98 
Against this backdrop, the third ground of appeal was also rejected and the appeal was dismissed. 
 
 
4. Comments: The Blurred Boundaries Between Procedural and Substantive Review. 
 
The following sub-sections endeavour to sketch out a few comments on this very complex case. Sub-
section 4.1. argues that the Courts’ unilateral focus on the Commission’s procedural margins of 
discretion and procedural duty to take “all relevant factors” into consideration is misleading, and fails 
to capture what is truly at stake in the case. Indeed, and as anticipated since the introductory section, 
Bilbaína perfectly exemplifies how the boundaries between a procedural review of the Commission’s 
duty to take “all relevant factors” into consideration and a substantive review of the scientific 
soundness of the evidence relied upon are inherently blurred. 
Building on this finding, sub-section 4.2. claims that the procedural framing of this case turns out to 
obscure the substantive implications of the adoption of different scientific methodologies. At the heart 
of this case, in fact, lies the Commission’s choice to draw on a prudential risk assessment, and opt for 
a precautionary classification of CTPHT’s level of aquatic toxicity. 
Sub-section 4.3. turns to a concise analysis of the antecedent99 of the case under comment. Whilst the 
thread running between Bilbaína I and II is certainly the attempt to outline the boundaries of the 
Commission’s discretion, framing its duty to take “all relevant factors” into consideration, the two 
cases in fact reach diametrically opposite conclusions. Not only this makes it impossible to reconcile 
the decisions in Bilbaína I and II, but it also detracts from the consistency of the standard of review. 
Finally, section 5. sketches out some conclusive remarks, focusing on the far-reaching implications of 
the standard of review outlined in this case. 
 
 
4.1.  From Manifest Error of Assessment to Scientific Soundness? 
 
What is truly at stake in Cases T-689/13 and C-691/15 P, beyond the technical-scientific terminology 
and the complex references to different assessment methodologies? And how did the Court of Justice 
outline the scope of its review? Two irreconcilable interpretations of the issues at stake in this case are 
put forward by the General Court, Advocate General and Court of Justice, as opposed to the 
Commission. 
The Judgment of the Court of Justice is very specific in its framing of the questions of law underlying 
the case, and so is the Advocate General’s Opinion. The review of the Court of Justice directly targets 
the Commission’s margins of discretion in the application of the summation method, and focuses on 
whether the Commission fulfilled its duty to act diligently, taking “all relevant factors” into 
consideration.100 This is understood as a form of procedural review, whereby the Court of Justice 
                                                     
97 Judgment, para. 58. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, and Case C-287/13 P, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and 
Others v. ECHA. 
100 See supra, section 3., and specifically notes 37 and 59. 
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ascertains whether the General Court erred in law in holding that the Commission, by failing to take 
into consideration the overall solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance, committed a manifest error 
of assessment when applying the summation method.101 
Indeed, throughout their Judgments, both the General Court and the Court of Justice emphasise the 
allegedly procedural nature of the scrutiny in Bilbaína. To begin with, the Courts stress that – in 
accordance with settled case law – “where the EU authorities have a broad discretion, in particular as 
to the assessment of highly complex scientific and technical facts in order to determine the nature and 
scope of the measures which they adopt, review by the EU courts must be limited to verifying 
whether there has been a manifest error of assessment […]”.102 Accordingly, the Courts “cannot 
substitute their assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of the authorities on which alone 
the FEU Treaty has conferred that task”.103 Further than that, the General Court does also expressly 
mention that the “broad discretion of the EU authorities, which implies limited judicial review of its 
exercise, applies not only to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken but also, to some extent, 
to the findings of the basic facts”.104  
Whilst drawing on these premises, the General Court and the Court of Justice still underline that the 
exercise of the Commission’s discretion is not excluded from review by the Court; the Courts must 
therefore scrutinise whether the Commission complied with its duty to act diligently, in accordance 
with the principle of good administration,105 by examining “carefully and impartially all the relevant 
facts of the individual case on which that assessment was based”.106 As expressly maintained by the 
General Court, the EU authorities “must be able to show before the EU Courts that, in adopting the 
act, they actually exercised their discretion, which presupposes the taking into consideration of all the 
relevant facts and circumstances of the situation”;107 thus, the Commission’s ability to prove that it 
has taken “all relevant facts and circumstances” into consideration becomes a precondition for the 
Commission’s exercise of its discretion. 
The General Court, the Advocate General and the Court of Justice are all unequivocally committed to 
this procedural framing and interpretation of the issues at stake in Bilbaína. Although the reasoning of 
the Advocate General and of the Court is very clear, and appears to fully justify their conclusions, the 
assessment of CTPHT’s classification through the procedural lens of a review of the Commission’s 
                                                     
101 See supra, section 3.2. 
102 See the General Court in Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 23. See 
also the Judgment under comment, para. 34, “if the Commission is to be able to classify a substance pursuant to Regulation 
No. 1272/2008, account being taken of the complex scientific and technical assessments which it must undertake, it must be 
recognised as enjoying a broad discretion”, where the Court of Justice quotes Case C-326/05, Industrias Químicas del Vallés 
v. Commission, EU:C:2007:443, para. 75, and Case C-15/10, Etimine, EU:C:2011:504, para. 60. On the broad discretion of 
the Commission in cases involving complex technical-scientific evaluations see already Case C-331/88, Ex Parte Fedesa 
and Others, para. 14; Case C-157/96, Ex Parte National Farmers' Union and Others, para. 39; and COM(2000) 1 Final, 
Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 2, p. 15, section 5.2.2. For an overview on 
the “legislature’s political responsibilities and the correspondingly narrowed scope for judicial review” in EU risk regulation 
see Anderson, op. cit. supra note 9, pp. 431 ff.; see also Türk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Edward Elgar, 2009), pp. 136 and 
145.  
103 See the General Court in Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 23, 
quoting Case C-15/10, Etimine, para. 60; Case C-199/13 P, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group and Others v. Commission, 
para. 26; and Case T‑ 93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v ECHA, para. 76. 
104 See Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 24; Case T‑ 93/10, Bilbaína 
de Alquitranes and Others v ECHA, para. 77; and Case C-287/13 P, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 
20. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited, at para. 34, quoting – inter 
alia – Case C-326/05, Industrias Químicas del Vallés v. Commission, supra note 102, para. 77, and Case C-425/08, Enviro 
Tech (Europe), EU:C:2009:625, para. 62; and the decision of the Court of Justice in Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited, 
at para. 33. 
105 Judgment, para. 35; see also para. 33, and the Opinion, at para. 53 – as reported supra at note 59. 
106 Judgment, para. 35, quoting Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München, para. 14, Case C-326/05, Industrias 
Químicas del Vallés v. Commission, para. 77; Case C‑ 405/07 P, Netherlands v. Commission, EU:C:2008:613, para. 56; and 
Case C-77/09, Gowan Comércio, para. 57. 
107 See the General Court in Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 24. See 
supra, note 37, for further details. 
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discretion is misleading. In other words, the unilateral focus on the Commission’s discretion in the 
application of the summation method fails to capture what is truly at stake in the case; this is what the 
Commission – rightfully – pointed at. In fact, this case perfectly epitomises the blurred boundaries 
between a procedural review of the Commission’s duty to take “all relevant factors” into 
consideration, and a substantive review of the scientific soundness of the evidence relied upon. 
In its second ground of appeal the Commission clearly explained that, despite the General Court’s 
ruling that the Commission should have taken account of the characteristics of CTPHT as a whole 
substance in its application of the summation method, the choice, use and application of this 
methodology in fact postulate an analysis of the mixture’s components. This casts light on how the 
General Court’s argument is inconsistent with the very use and application of the summation method 
– which postulates the analysis of CTPHT as a mixture, and the calculation of the maximum rate of 
water solubility of its single components.  
Arguing that the low solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance is a “relevant factor” that the 
Commission should have taken into consideration in its application of the summation method, in 
practice, implies a direct shift from the use of the summation method to the use of a different 
methodology; in other words, and crucially, requiring the Commission to take account of CTPHT’s 
low solubility in its application of the summation method is tantamount to requiring the Commission 
to use the different methodology advocated by the applicants. It is then worth getting back to the first 
ground of appeal, whereby the Commission rightfully lamented the opaqueness of the General Court’s 
reasoning as to whether the Regulation was partially annulled because of the use of the summation 
method, or because of an error in its application.108 In fact, if the low solubility of CTPHT as a whole 
substance is held to be a “relevant factor”, any distinction between a review of the procedural 
application of the summation method and a review of its substantive use is plainly elusive. 
On these grounds the boundaries between the procedural review of the Commission’s alleged 
manifest error of assessment, and the substantive review of the scientific soundness of the 
methodology and evidence relied upon, get increasingly blurred.  
This ultimately results in a breach of the Commission’s broad discretion, as applying “not only to the 
nature and scope of the measures to be taken but also […] to the findings of the basic facts”,109 and 
into a direct contradiction of the Courts’ own acknowledgment that in cases of high technical-
scientific complexity “review by the EU courts must be limited to verifying whether there has been a 
manifest error of assessment […]”,110 and the courts “cannot substitute their assessment of scientific 
and technical facts for that of the authorities on which alone the FEU Treaty has conferred that 
task”.111 From this perspective this case exemplifies how, as rightfully noted, the increasing 
“scientification” of the Court’s review112 expands on the scrutiny of the Commission’s compliance 
with all relevant procedural guarantees, and on the procedural assessment of the plausibility of the 
final decision.113 In this case, indeed, the Court’s allegedly procedural review of the Commission’s 
duty to take “all relevant factors” into account results in an indirect substantive scrutiny of the 
scientific soundness of the assessment methodology used.  
 
 
 
                                                     
108 Judgment, paras. 19 and 20. 
109 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 24; and supra, note 104. 
110 See supra, note 102, in detail. 
111 See supra, note 103, in detail. 
112 See supra, note 9. 
113 Dąbrowska Klosinska, op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 205 and 208. 
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4.2. The Substantive Implications Beneath the Procedural Surface: The ECHA’s Prudential 
Risk Assessment and the Commission’s Precautionary Classification of CTPHT. 
 
If the Court’s interpretation fails to capture what is truly at stake in the classification of CTPHT, what 
lies underneath the procedural surface? The procedural framing of this case, in fact, obscures the 
substantive implications of the adoption of different assessment methodologies. The use and 
application of different models for risk assessment has a significant impact on any ensuing technical-
scientific classification and/or on risk quantification.114 There is nothing monolithic, neutral or 
objective about – allegedly – “sound” science;115 whilst in-built scientific bias is almost impossible for 
lay people to detect, different scientific methodologies reflect a plurality of diverging approaches to 
the qualification or quantification of complex risks. This is quite apparent from the case of CTPHT: 
the applicants supported the use of the WAF approach, resulting in a low aquatic toxicity index for 
CTPHT, whereas the ECHA chose to apply the summation method, with a very different outcome.  
From this perspective the Commission, by deferring to the ECHA Risk Assessment Committee’s 
choice to use and apply the summation method, did in fact exercise its discretion, concurring with the 
ECHA’s decision to undertake a prudential assessment116 of CTPHT’s aquatic toxicity. Despite the 
Commission’s rather unfortunate argument about its own lack of discretion, whereby it claimed that 
“it is important only to ascertain, using the summation method, whether the thresholds set by the 
Regulation No. 1272/2008 are met, without the Commission having any margins of discretion 
whatsoever in that regard”,117 the Commission in fact implicitly exercised its discretion by referring to 
the results of a prudential risk assessment, by using them to underpin the categorisation of CTPHT, 
and by refusing to give any substantial weight to the data on the low water solubility of CTPHT as a 
whole substance. In other words, in the face of persisting scientific uncertainty and of incomplete, 
inconclusive and insufficient scientific data,118 the Commission chose to rely on the ECHA’s 
prudential risk assessment, and opted for a precautionary classification of CTPHT’s level of aquatic 
toxicity. 
At the heart of this case, then, lies the Commission’s choice to adopt a precautionary approach to the 
governance of the uncertain risks posed by UVCB substances. This is apparent from a careful reading 
                                                     
114 As rightfully noted by Majone the choice of one model of assessment, rather than another – for instance the use of a 
linear, rather than a threshold model for a dose-response function – is critical to the relevant classification of a substance, or 
to the quantification of a risk. In this perspective, the determination of technical experts may in fact pre-empt decision-
making by risk managers. On this point, see Majone, “Foundations of Risk Regulation: Science, Decision-Making, Policy 
Learning and Institutional Reform” 1 EJRR (2010) 5, at 10.  
115 The denigrators of the precautionary principle refer to a “neutral” and “objective” sound science approach, as opposed to 
“politicised” precautionary approaches to the governance of uncertain risks. See inter alia Graham and Wiener, Risk v. Risk. 
Trade-Offs in Protecting Health and the Environment (Harvard University Press, 1997); Sunstein, Laws of Fear. Beyond the 
Precautionary Principle (CUP, 2005); Pollack and Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails. The International Law and Politics of 
Genetically Modified Foods (OUP, 2009); Pollack and Shaffer, “The EU Regulatory System for GMOs”, in Everson and 
Vos,  
(eds.) Uncertain Risks Regulated (Routledge, 2009), 269 ff.; Wiener, “The Rhetoric of Precaution”, in Wiener, Rogers, 
Hammitt and Sand (eds.) The Reality of Precaution. Comparing Risk Regulation in the United States and Europe 
(Routledge, 2011); Sunstein, “Precautions Against What? Perceptions, Heuristics and Culture”, ibid. For an advocacy of 
evidence-based approaches in EU law, see Alemanno, op. cit. supra no. 1; Alemanno, “The Shaping of European Risk 
Regulation by Community Courts” (2008) Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 18/2008; Alemanno, “The Fabulous Destiny of 
Bisphenol A (BPA)” (2010) 1 EJRR 397; Alemanno, “The Science, Law and Politics of Neonicotinoids and Bees. A New 
Test Case for the Precautionary Principle” (2013) 4 EJRR 191. 
116 See supra, note 2. 
117 See the Judgment, para. 30 – reporting the Commission’s argument. 
118 See COM(2000) 1 Final, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 7, section 1, defining a situation of scientific uncertainty – warranting 
the adoption of a precautionary approach – as a situation where scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive or 
uncertain,  and where the potential risk may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection of the relevant values at 
stake. See also supra, note 2 and note 3. In the case law see explicitly, inter alia, Case C-157/96, Ex Parte National Farmers' 
Union and Others, para. 64, supra note 7; Case C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Commission, para. 100, supra note 7; and, 
more recently, Case C-333/08, Commission v. France, EU:C:2010:44, paras. 92 and 93. 
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of the decisions of the General Court and of the Court of Justice. The applicants, on the basis of the 
scientific studies carried out by CTPHT producers,119 advocated the use of the WAF approach:120 the 
ECHA, however, disagreed for a plurality of reasons.  
First, as documented by the ECHA Risk Assessment Committee’s background document,121 many of 
the PAH constituents of CTPHT are phototoxic; the impact of CTPHT on aquatic species should have 
been tested in the presence of UV irradiation, but all studies based on the WAF approach were 
performed in the absence of UV irradiation.122 This made all the scientific data collected through the 
application of the WAF approach incomplete and insufficient to fully evaluate the aquatic toxicity of 
CTPHT as a whole substance, and scientific uncertainty persisted as to the reliability of these 
studies.123 Secondly, all the studies performed by CTPHT producers through the application of the 
WAF approach had been carried out with a single loading.124 Finally, the summation method was held 
to be the most suitable to apply in so far as it also takes into account the persistence and 
bioaccumulation potential of a mixture.125  
In the light of the highly complex interpretational problems triggered by UVCB substances, whose 
chemical composition is unknown or variable and whose reactions depend on the behaviour of each 
component of the mixture,126 the ECHA opted for the summation method because this would – 
ultimately – result in a prudential risk assessment. Indeed, the General Court noted that by applying 
the summation method the ECHA could “attach more weight to the highly toxic constituents of 
CTPHT”127 and that, by assuming that all the PAH constituents of CTPHT dissolved in the water 
phase and were available to aquatic organisms, it could provide “an overestimation of the toxicity of 
CTPHT [to be] regarded as the worst case scenario”;128 in a similar vein, the Court of Justice 
remarked that the summation method gives due consideration to the fact that “Acute 1 and Chronic 1 
components contribute to the toxicity of the mixture even at a low concentration”.129 
From this perspective the Commission, in choosing to align to the results of the ECHA’s prudential 
risk assessment, exercised its discretion to opt for a precautionary classification of CTPHT’s levels of 
aquatic toxicity: precautionary decision-making, thus, lies at the heart of this case.  
What conclusions are we to draw from these reflections? On the one hand, the substantive rationale 
and substantive implications of the ECHA’s risk assessment and of the Commission’s categorisation 
of CTPHT are completely obscured by the Courts’ procedural review of the Commission’s duty to 
take “all relevant factors” into consideration. Not only this does not do justice to the Commission’s 
precautionary approach to the governance of the uncertain environmental risks posed by CTPHT; but 
also, it simultaneously shifts the focus onto the Commission’s alleged procedural breach of its duty of 
good administration.  
On the other hand, however, it is worth noting that the Commission did neither at the General Court 
nor at the appeal stage ever refer to its discretionary power to draw on the ECHA’s prudential 
assessment and enact a precautionary classification of CTPHT’s level of aquatic toxicity. Whilst the 
                                                     
119 The first nine applicants (Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA, Deza a.s., Industrial Química del Nalón SA, Koppers Denmark AS, 
Koppers UK Ltd, Koppers Netherlands BV, Rütgers  Basic Aromatics GmbH, Rütgers  Belgium NV and Rütgers Poland Sp. 
Zoo) in Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, are all producers and/or suppliers 
of CTPHT. 
120 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 25. 
121 See specifically point 7.6. 
122 See the Opinion, para. 17, and Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 27. 
123 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 27. 
124 Opinion, para. 17. 
125 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 27. 
126 On the specific problems of classification as to biodegradation, bioaccumulation, partitioning behaviour and water 
solubility see the Judgment at para. 43.  
127 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 7. 
128 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 31. 
129 Judgment, para. 4. 
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incompleteness, inconclusiveness and insufficiency of the scientific data130 obtained through the use 
of the WAF approach warranted the use of the summation method, the Commission did not venture to 
suggest that taking the low solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance131 into consideration as a 
“relevant factor” would ultimately run counter to the prudential risk assessment performed by the 
ECHA, and result in a departure from the Commission’s precautionary approach to the classification 
of CTPHT.132  
Had the Commission clearly spelled out the substantive impact of the use and application of different 
scientific methodologies, it could have expressly argued that taking the low solubility of CTPHT as a 
whole substance into account is plainly inconsistent with the ECHA’s prudential approach to risk 
assessment,133 and with the achievement of the level of environmental protection deemed to be 
appropriate.134 In turn, this would have arguably reconnected to the crucial issue of the Commission’s 
discretion, as applying “not only to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken but also […] to 
the findings of the basic facts”.135  
Although it is hard to envisage whether this argument could have benefited the Commission, or 
strengthened its position in the case,136 it is still worth noting that the latter is completely silent on the 
prudential nature of the ECHA’s assessment, as well as on the precautionary classification of CTPHT 
as a (H400) and (H410) substance. A close look at the Judgments confirms that any such reference is 
missing in Bilbaína: the precautionary principle is nowhere to be found. 
 
 
4.3.  Reconciling Bilbaína I and Bilbaína II: Taking “All Relevant Factors” Into Account? 
 
As anticipated in section 3. the case under consideration, which will be referred to in this section as 
“Bilbaína II”, has one important antecedent. In case T-93/10137 and appeal case C-287/13 P138 
(hereafter, “Bilbaína I”) the nine applicants/appellants, eight of which were also parties to Bilbaína 
II, sought the partial annulment of a 2010 decision of the ECHA139 identifying CTPHT as a very 
persistent and very bioaccumulative (“vPvB”) substance in accordance with Article 57(a), (d) and (e) 
of the REACH Regulation. The ECHA had opted for this classification of CTPHT upon a risk 
assessment conducted through the use and application of the summation method. The similarities 
between Bilbaína I and Bilbaína II are therefore quite clear: despite the difference in the legal basis 
for the adoption of the challenged decisions,140 the applicants, the substance whose classification was 
at stake and the methodology used and applied by the ECHA are in fact exactly the same. The only 
                                                     
130 See supra, note 118. 
131 See supra section 4.1. Requiring the Commission to take account of the low solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance in 
its application of the summation method is tantamount to requiring the Commission to use a different methodology. 
132 See infra, section 5. If the low solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance is identified as a “relevant factor” to be taken 
into account in the application of the summation method, it is hard to envisage the possibility for the Commission to enact – 
the same – precautionary classification of CTPHT. 
133 See supra, note 118. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Case T-689/13, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. European Commission, para. 24; and supra, note 104. 
136 The question is whether, if the Commission had explicitly referred to the prudential nature of the ECHA’s risk 
assessment and to its own precautionary approach to the categorisation of CTPHT, the ruling would have been different. In a 
very different vein, at the core of the appeal is the argument that the Commission lacks any discretion in the application of 
the summation method – see supra, sections 2. and 3. 
137 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, supra note 80. 
138 Case C-287/13 P, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, supra note 81. 
139 The decision of the ECHA, published on 13 January 2010, to identify pitch, coal tar, high temperature (EC No. 266-028-
2) as a substance meeting the criteria laid out in Article 57 of the REACH Regulation, see supra note 22. 
140 In Bilbaína I the legal basis for the classification of CTPHT as a vPvB substance is the REACH Regulation (see supra, 
note 22), whereas in Bilbaína II the legal basis is the CLP Regulation (see supra, note 15). 
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relevant difference lies in that the REACH Regulation, setting out the criteria for the identification of 
vPvB substances, did not make any explicit reference to the summation method.141   
In Bilbaína I,  the nine applicants challenged the ECHA’s departure from the criteria expressly 
provided for in Articles 59(2) and (3) and Annexes XIII and XV of the REACH Regulation;142 in 
other words, they challenged the ECHA’s decision to use and apply the summation method, even 
though this assessment methodology was not provided for under the REACH Regulation.143 Thus, the 
applicants contended that the ECHA had committed a manifest error of assessment. 
In setting out the scope of its review the General Court emphasised the broad discretion of the EU 
institutions, in so far as they are able to show that they took into consideration “all the relevant factors 
and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to regulate”.144 To begin with, the General 
Court noted that “it cannot simply be held that the ECHA made a manifest error of assessment in 
taking the view that [CTPHT had] vPvB properties on the grounds that its constituents had such 
properties”.145 Although the REACH Regulation did not expressly provide for the use and application 
of the summation method, the Court found that it did not preclude that approach.146 The opposite 
conclusion, the Court ruled, would not take into account the overarching aims of the REACH 
Regulation – and particularly the achievement of a high level of public health and environmental 
protection, the proper control of any risks posed by substances of very high concern and their 
progressive replacement by suitable alternative substances or technologies, whenever economically 
and technically viable.147 
The General Court then went on to assess whether the ECHA’s decision to use and apply the 
summation method was based on well-established practices rooted in EU legislation, and on scientific 
reasons.148 In both respects, the General Court concurred with the ECHA’s view. On the one hand, 
focusing on the relevance of the summation method under EU law, the General Court found that this 
methodology is explicitly provided for in Article 53(2) of the CLP Regulation.149 On the other hand, 
and turning to an analysis of the ECHA’s choice to use and apply the summation method, the General 
Court developed three considerations.  
First, it found that the use and application of the summation method was suitable because “once in the 
environment the individual constituents of [CTPHT] will behave as independent substances [which] 
will release several PAHs with PBT or vPvB properties during use, for example by heating during 
processing or by leaching upon contact with water”.150  
Secondly, the Court noted that the analysis of UVCB substances as a whole151 – rather than by 
reference to their single components – “does not lead to significant results for the great majority of 
substances, including CTPHT”.152 Crucially, the General Court expressly maintained that the 
persistence of UVCB substances cannot be properly assessed by using “biodegradation testing 
methods that measure […] the properties of the whole substance but do not provide information on its 
                                                     
141 Unlike in the case of the CLP regulation, where the possibility to use and apply the summation method is expressly 
provided for in Article 53(2) and Annex I, point 4.1.3.2. 
142 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 74. 
143 For an exhaustive overview of the three pleas in law raised by the applicants see Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes 
SA and Others v. ECHA, paras. 67 ff. 
144 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 77. 
145 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 83. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid., referring to Article 1(1) of REACH Regulation, supra note 22. See also para. 69, referring to Recital 1 of the 
Preamble to the REACH Regulation, and Title VII – particularly Article 55 – of the REACH Regulation.  
148 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 86. 
149 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 87; and indeed, the CLP Regulation is at issue in 
Bilbaína II. 
150 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 90. 
151 As the applicants advocated in both Bilbaína I and Bilbaína II. 
152 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 91. 
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constituents”, 153 as “even if in such a test the whole substance might appear to be readily 
biodegradable, the presence of nonbiodegradable constituents cannot be ruled out”.154 Further than 
that, the General Court clarified that according to the ECHA “similar difficulties are encountered in 
bioaccumulation and toxicity testing for UVCB substances”;155 whilst the physical form of the 
substance considered as a whole
156
 “may impede the release of its individual constituents to any 
significant extent if the substance is tested as such, in reality, after a certain time, PAH constituents 
will be released into the environment”.157 Thus, taking into consideration the features of the UVCB 
substance as a whole is liable to result in an under-classification of its actual bioaccumulation or 
toxicity level.158  
Finally, and building on the above considerations, the General Court decided not to give any 
substantial weight to the applicants’ argument on leaching, whereby they claimed that “all short term 
and chronic tests confirm that [the separate toxic constituents] are trapped in the high-molecular 
matrix [of CTPHT as a whole substance] and do not create toxic effects when, for example, they are 
in contact with water”.159 On these grounds, the General Court dismissed the applicants’ plea on the 
ECHA’s manifest error of assessment: the decision of the Court of Justice upheld the General Court’s 
ruling. 
What is the connection between Bilbaína I and II, and how to reconcile the rationale of the two cases? 
At the core of Bilbaína I was the issue of the Commission’s discretionary power to depart from the 
criteria laid out in the REACH Regulation: the General Court and the Court of Justice found that the 
Commission – in its duty to take “all relevant factors” into account – was not precluded from using 
and applying the summation method, even though that assessment methodology was not expressly 
provided for under the REACH Regulation.  
Bilbaína II marks another step and elaborates further on the duty of the Commission to take “all 
relevant factors” into account. In Bilbaína II the General Court and the Court of Justice held that the 
Commission, in its application of the summation method, was not precluded from taking the low 
aquatic solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance into account: moreover, and in accordance with its 
duty to consider “all relevant factors”, it should have given due consideration to these data. 
In this light, the thread running between the two cases is certainly the attempt to outline the 
boundaries of the Commission’s discretion, and to frame its duty to take “all relevant factors” into 
consideration. As the Advocate General put it in in his Opinion in Bilbaína II, “if there is indeed 
discretion, it must be accepted that such discretion can cut both ways”:160 from this perspective it 
would appear that the Commission had a right to take “all relevant factors” into account in Bilbaína I, 
as much as a duty to do so in Bilbaína II. However, is this the case? Does this interpretation do justice 
                                                     
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid.  
155 Ibid. 
156 Rather than the physical form of the constituents of the mixture – which is the specific focus of analysis under the 
summation method. 
157 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 91. Indeed, it is worth noting that this is exactly 
what the Commission argued in Bilbaína II – namely, that it could not take the low water solubility of CTPHT as a whole 
substance into consideration when applying the summation method, because that would distort the entire risk assessment and 
result in the use and application of a different methodology. 
158 This is what lies at the heart of Bilbaína II, as argued supra, in section 4.2. Taking into account the low solubility of 
CTPHT as a whole substance is inconsistent with the methodological premises of the summation method and with a 
prudential risk assessment. 
159 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 94. This is exactly the evidence on which the 
applicants relied to have the Commission’s decision in Bilbaína II invalidated by the General Court; on the other hand, and 
from a diametrically opposite perspective, the General Court in Bilbaína I decided to disregard it. The only relevant 
difference lies in that in Bilbaína I the applicants merely referred to the scientific studies at issue, without attaching them 
(see Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 94), whereas in Bilbaína II they more thoroughly 
elaborated on their relevance for the assessment of CTPHT’s aquatic toxicity (see supra, section 2). 
160 Opinion, para. 84. See also at para. 92: “if one accepts some degree of discretion as a matter of principle, one must accept 
that that discretion can cut both ways”. 
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to the issues at stake in both cases, and does it make the standard of review deployed by the Courts 
consistent? Whilst a connection exists, the two cases in fact reach diametrically opposite conclusions. 
On the one hand, in Bilbaína I, the Courts ruled that the Commission, in taking “all relevant factors” 
into consideration, was not precluded from applying the summation method. Crucially, the General 
Court emphasised that testing CTPHT as a whole substance is likely to result in an under-
classification of its toxicity level: moreover, it expressly clarified that whilst the physical form of the 
substance considered as a whole161 “may impede the release of its individual constituents to any 
significant extent if the substance is tested as such, in reality, after a certain time, PAH constituents 
will be released into the environment”.162 Thus, the General Court did not give any substantial weight 
to the applicants’ argument, whereby they claimed that that the Commission should have taken the 
inert inherent properties of CTPHT as a whole substance into consideration in its assessment. 
On the other hand, in Bilbaína II, the Courts held that the Commission had committed a manifest error 
of assessment by failing to take “all relevant factors” into account: the “relevant factors” which the 
Commission had failed to take into consideration, however, were the same inert inherent properties of 
CTPHT as a whole substance that the Commission had actually decided to disregard in Bilbaína I. 
Beyond the procedural surface, the decision in Bilbaína II marks a substantive U-turn: the shift is 
most apparent in these two cases, where the substance whose classification is at stake and the 
assessment methodology are exactly the same.163 How to square the circle, then? 
A closer look at Bilbaína I and II, in fact, testifies that not only in these two cases the Courts provided 
a diametrically opposite interpretation of the “relevant factors” at stake in the assessment of CTPHT; 
but also, and ultimately, they applied two different standards of review.  
On the one hand, in Bilbaína I, the General Court opted for a deferential standard of review, limiting 
the scope of its scrutiny to the procedural review of any manifest error of assessment. Although the 
General Court did certainly engage with the substance of the relevant scientific evidence in the case, it 
ultimately concluded that the Commission’s discretionary choice to use and apply the summation 
method was not an arbitrary one.164 
On the other hand, in Bilbaína II, the General Court applied a much more intrusive standard of 
scrutiny, blurring the boundaries between the procedural review of any alleged manifest error of 
assessment and the substantive review of the scientific soundness of the summation method.165 By 
identifying the low aquatic solubility of CTPHT as a “relevant factor” to directly take into account, as 
already explained, it ultimately tipped the balance in favour of the use and application of a different 
methodology, disregarding the Commission’s choice to rely on a prudential risk assessment and enact 
a precautionary classification.166 
Against this overall background, the review of the “relevant factors” that the Commission shall take 
into account turns out to be a more problematic – and potentially inconsistent – standard than it would 
appear at first sight. Who holds the authority to decide what is a “relevant factor” and whether this 
should be part of the Commission’s assessment?  
                                                     
161 Rather than the physical form of the single components, as assessed under the use and application of the summation 
method. 
162 Case T-93/10, Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others v. ECHA, para. 91. 
163 In other words, throughout Bilbaína I  and Bilbaína II, the position of the applicants and the position of the Commission 
stay unchanged. The applicants consistently called for the assessment of the inert inherent properties of CTPHT as a whole 
substance, resulting in a lower classification of its level of aquatic toxicity; the Commission, on the other hand, opted for a 
prudential risk assessment, through the use and application of the summation method, and for a precautionary classification 
of CTPHT’s index of aquatic toxicity. 
164 The standard of review applied in Bilbaína I is ultimately the same deployed in Case C-326/05, Industrias Químicas del 
Vallés v. Commission, Case C-425/08, Enviro Tech (Europe), and Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited. 
165 See supra, section 4.1. 
166 See supra, section 4.2. 
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It is legitimate to conclude that if in cases involving complex technical-scientific assessments the 
Courts “cannot substitute their assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of the authorities on 
which alone the FEU Treaty has conferred that task”,167 the review of the “relevant factors” that the 
Commission ought to take into consideration turns out to be a slippery slope. As Bilbaína I and II 
clearly show, the review of the Commission’s duty to take “all relevant factors” into account may 
underpin or undermine the use of one assessment methodology, enabling the courts to arbitrarily pick 
and choose different strands of scientific evidence in favour of either a precautionary168 or an 
evidence-based169 approach.  
From this perspective, the only way forward to restore an authentically procedural standard of review 
in cases involving complex scientific assessments postulates a turn back to the review of the 
Commission’s compliance with the relevant procedural conditions, the accuracy of fact-finding, and 
the existence of any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of power;170 in other words, the Court’s 
scrutiny must target the rational consistency between the scientific findings emerging from the 
technical risk assessment, on the one hand, and the final decision, on the other hand.171 As Advocate 
General Kokott rightfully suggested in her Opinion in Afton Chemical Limited, “what matters is 
whether [an alleged] error of assessment [is] legally relevant”;172 whilst this postulates that the 
Commission’s assessment should not be arbitrary or unsubstantiated, it certainly does not imply that it 
should be scientifically “sound”. 
One last point, hinted at in the case under comment, needs to be briefly addressed in this section. In 
paragraph 81 of his Opinion on Bilbaína II, as already mentioned, the Advocate General stressed the 
need to look beyond the individual case: he then went on to highlight that even though the 
Commission’s “error of assessment” in Bilbaína II had resulted in the most severe hazard 
classification, the opposite may occur, and the Commission’s alleged “inability to take into account 
other relevant factors [may] ultimately lead to a lower hazard classification than might otherwise be 
justified”.173 In other words, if it is true that discretion can be exercised in a way which facilitates 
precautionary regulation, it is equally true that it may result in low and insufficiently stringent 
standards. In this light, the Advocate General suggested, a direct scrutiny of the Commission’s duty to 
take “all relevant factors” into consideration turns out to be all the more important. 
Whilst the Advocate General certainly has a point, an intrusive review of whether the Commission 
has taken “all relevant factors” and all scientific evidence into account, as outlined in Bilbaína II, does 
not appear to be a solution to the potential problems posed by insufficiently stringent standards. In 
fact, as testified by the inconsistencies in Bilbaína I and II, the outcome of this test is unpredictable: 
as already mentioned, the Courts’ identification and interpretation of the “relevant factors” at stake in 
a case may turn out to facilitate or obstruct a precautionary approach to the governance of uncertain 
risks. Further than that, and as Bilbaína II shows, the “relevant factors” test might as well pave the 
way for a quasi-substantive review of the scientific evidence relied upon, marking a further step 
towards the scrutiny of scientific “soundness”. 
                                                     
167 See supra, note 103. 
168 As occurred in Bilbaína I – respecting the Commission’s (precautionary) approach. 
169 As in Bilbaína II – through a “quasi-substantive” review of the scientific evidence relied upon by the Commission. For 
the far-reaching implications of this standard of review see infra, section 5. 
170 Crucially, in this perspective, see the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-77/09 Gowan, at paras. 70 to 74, 
supra note 7; the Judgment of the Court in Case C-77/09 Gowan, at paras. 71 to 79, supra note 7; and the Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott in Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited, paras. 27 to 34, para. 85 and paras. 89 to 93, supra 
note 7. 
171 See specifically the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-77/09 Gowan, at paras. 70 to 74, supra note 7, and 
the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited, paras. 89 to 93, supra note 7. 
172 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Limited, para. 30. 
173 Opinion, para. 81. See also the Opinion, at paras. 83 and 92, and the Judgment, at para. 46. 
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Once again, then, how to square the circle? Albeit overlapping, the Commission’s margins of 
procedural discretion and the substantive value of precautionary public health and environmental 
protection are two different – and distinguishable – aspects.174 This is apparent from an analysis of 
Bilbaína II, where the arguments on the Commission’s broad discretionary power to take “all relevant 
factors” into account when applying the summation method175 go hand in hand with a review of the 
scientific soundness of its decision, undermining the Commission’s precautionary approach.176 For 
this reason, demarcating the boundaries between the procedural dimension of the Commission’s 
discretion, on the one hand, and the substantive value of the precautionary principle, on the other, may 
turn out to be helpful. 
From this perspective, the precautionary principle ought to be appreciated in its self-standing 
substantive value – as acknowledged by the TFEU177 and in the broader framework of EU risk 
regulation, EU environmental law and the EU regulation of chemicals.178 To put it differently, the 
precautionary principle would come to be interpreted as an inherent – substantive  – limit to the 
Commission’s broad – procedural – discretion in cases involving complex technical-scientific 
assessments: the discretion of the Commission would then have to be exercised in accordance with 
the high standards of public health and environmental protection enshrined in the broader framework 
of EU risk regulation and environmental law.179 
Whilst this could provide an alternative answer to the argument of the Advocate General, whereby he 
claimed that the scrutiny of the Commission’s duty to take “all relevant factors” into consideration 
would limit the Commission’s power to enact low and insufficiently stringent standard, re-framing the 
precautionary principle as an inherent substantive limit to the Commission’s procedural discretion 
triggers an array of highly complex questions. How far can the precautionary principle inform judicial 
review, with a view to safeguarding the intended EU level of health and environmental protection and 
ensuring that protective standards are enacted?180 Should the Commission be bound to ignore any risk 
                                                     
174 Although commentators usually assume that the two dimensions go hand in hand, drawing a direct parallelism between 
the latitude of the Commission’s discretion and the Courts’ adherence to a procedural standard of review – on the one hand 
– and a precautionary approach to EU risk regulation – on the other hand. See e.g. Anderson, op. cit. supra note 9; Fisher, 
Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2007), on the Rational-Instrumental and 
Deliberative-Cooperative paradigms of administration in the field of risk regulation; Weimer, “Risk Regulation, GMOs and 
the Challenges to Deliberation in EU Governance: Politicisation and Scientification as Co-Producing Trends”, in Joerges and 
Glinski (eds.) The European Crisis and the Transformation of Transnational Governance: Authoritarian Managerialism 
Versus Democratic Governance (Hart Publishing, 2014), 295 ff.; and Weimer and Pisani, “Expertise and Justification. The 
Contested Legitimation of the EU Risk Administration”, in De Ruijter and Weimer (eds.) Regulating Risks in the European 
Union. The Co-Production of Expert and Executive Power (Hart Publishing, 2017). Nonetheless, and as Bilbaína II shows, a 
procedural review of the Commission’s – broad – margins of discretion may as well go hand in hand with a thorough 
scrutiny of the scientific soundness of the evidence relied upon. 
175 At the procedural level. 
176 At the substantive level. 
177 See the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. 2012, C 326, Article 191(2), 
“Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the 
various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action 
should be taken […]”. 
178 See, inter alia, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. 2012, C 326, Article 
191(2), “The Commission, in its proposals […] concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer 
protection, will take as a base a high level of protection”; and COM(2000) 1 Final, Communication from the Commission on 
the Precautionary Principle, supra note 2, p. 8, section 2, “The search for a high level of health and safety and environmental 
and consumer protection belongs in the framework of the single market, which is the cornerstone of the Community”, and p. 
8, section 3, “The Community has consistently endeavoured to achieve a high level of protection, among others in 
environment and human, animal and plant health”. On the relevance of the precautionary principle under EU environmental 
law, see Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making, 2nd ed. (Hart Publishing, 2014), chapters 1 and 2; 
on the EU Regulation of Chemicals, specifically, see Recital 1 of the Preamble to the REACH Regulation and Article 1(1) 
therein, supra note 22; and Recitals 1 to 4 of the Preamble to the CLP Regulation and Article 1 therein, supra note 15. 
179 For an understanding of the precautionary principle as a “sword”, rather than as a mere “shield”, see already Scott and 
Vos, “The Juridification of Uncertainty: Observations on the Ambivalence of the Precautionary Principle Within the EU and 
the WTO”, in Joerges and Dehousse (eds.) Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP, 2002), 253 ff. 
180 See supra notes 2, 3 and 118. 
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assessment which is found to be insufficiently prudential, in so far as taking it into consideration 
would be inconsistent with the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle?181 How would the 
Courts outline the boundaries of scientific uncertainty, or define the “prudential” nature of a risk 
assessment?182 And when is precautionary risk management to be understood as “precautionary” 
enough?  
Substantiating the precautionary principle in legal – rather than political – terms183 appears to be just 
as hard as reviewing compliance with it. Indeed, this is the challenge posed by the deployment of the 
precautionary principle as a “sword”, rather than a “shield”.184 Whilst certainly difficult, carving out a 
role for the precautionary principle as a “sword” could still be a promising way forward to judicially 
review whether public health and environmental standards are stringent enough, and comply with the 
high level of protection enshrined in the Treaties. In any case, it would still be a more promising way 
forward than the intrusive review of the Commission’s duty to take “all relevant factors” into 
consideration, as specifically outlined in Bilbaína II. 
 
 
5. Conclusions: From the Entrenchment of A Quasi-Substantive Standard of Review To The 
Gradual Demise of EU Precautionary Risk Regulation. 
 
This section addresses one final but crucial aspect of Bilbaína II. As already explained, the Court of 
Justice rejected the third ground of appeal, whereby the Commission argued that the General Court 
had distorted the scientific evidence in the case and had abused the limits of judicial review.185 The 
Commission explicitly maintained that the General Court, by picking and choosing the data on the 
low solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance to invalidate the Commission’s classification, had 
disregarded the rest of the available scientific evidence and had directly substituted its own 
assessment for that of the Commission.186 The Court of Justice, on the other hand, held that the 
General Court had not substituted its own assessment for that of the Commission, because the General 
Court had exclusively focused “on the procedural question of determining whether the Commission, 
in classifying CTPHT, complied with its obligation to take into consideration all the relevant factors 
and circumstances”.187 
Section 4.1. has showed how the standard of scrutiny outlined in Bilbaína II, in fact, lies at the 
crossroads between a procedural review of the Commission’s duty to take “all relevant factors” at 
stake into account, and a substantive review of the scientific soundness of the summation method. 
This consideration triggers one further question: had the Commission directly taken the low solubility 
of CTPHT as a whole substance into consideration in the decision-making process,188 would it have 
still been in the position to classify it as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance? Had 
the Commission complied with its procedural duty to give due consideration to “all relevant factors”, 
                                                     
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 For the view that compliance with the precautionary principle raises “policy concerns which must be dealt with in 
political fora”, and that “it is not for this or any other court to determine proper national or [EU] environmental policy”, see 
the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Joined Cases C-439/05 and C-454/05, Land Oberösterreich and Austria v 
Commission, EU:C:2007:285, para. 145. However, it is worth underlining that in this case the precautionary principle was 
not directly relevant to any of the legal issues at stake; in fact, the appellants were seeking the annulment of the 
Commission’s Decision to reject Austria’s request for a derogation on the grounds of (what is today) Article 114(5) TFEU. 
184 Scott and Vos, “The Juridification of Uncertainty: Observations on the Ambivalence of the Precautionary Principle 
Within the EU and the WTO”, op. cit. supra note 179. 
185 Judgment, para. 57. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Judgment, para. 58. 
188 In its “procedural” application of the summation method – see supra, section 3. and section 4.1.  
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as outlined by the General Court and upheld by the Court of Justice, would it have been allowed to 
reach the same substantive conclusion on the classification of CTPHT? 
The Court of Justice is silent on this point, but the Advocate General is not. In his Opinion, the latter 
maintained that “I am in no way suggesting that, on the merits, the result arrived at by the 
Commission is unsustainable. I pass no judgment whatsoever on the (in)correct classification of 
CTPHT”;189 further than that, the Advocate General went on to clarify that “at no point does (or 
indeed could) the General Court hold that if, hypothetically, the Commission had taken the low 
solubility of CTPHT into account, it would have committed a manifest error of assessment in going 
on to classify CTPHT as Aquatic Acute 1 or Aquatic Chronic 1”.190 Thus, “it is the Commission’s 
objective failure to take that element into account in its reasoning, as confirmed by the General Court, 
which resulted in the partial annulment of the contested regulation”.191 Nonetheless, is this truly the 
case?  Is it fair to argue that the Commission could have reached the same exact substantive 
conclusions, upon procedurally taking the low solubility of CTPHT as a whole substance into direct 
account in its decision? To put it differently, is it plausible to envisage a precautionary classification 
in the absence of a prudential risk assessment? Whilst possible in theory, this is neither too 
convincing nor too feasible in practice.  
It is reasonable to suggest that if the Commission had taken the low solubility of CTPHT into direct 
consideration, when applying the summation method, it would have not had any scientific evidence 
available to substantiate a precautionary classification. CTPHT would have appeared to be very 
stable, and its low solubility index would have not warranted its classification as an Aquatic Acute 1 
and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance.192 If the Commission had reached the same substantive – 
precautionary – conclusions, upon procedurally taking the low solubility of CTPHT into direct 
account, it would have arguably committed a manifest error of assessment. In that case, indeed, its 
final decision would have been arbitrary as well as rationally inconsistent with the scientific findings 
of the risk assessment.193 On the grounds of these considerations, and getting back to the Advocate 
General’s point, it is in fact legitimate to doubt that the Commission could have reached the same 
substantive conclusions, upon complying with the procedural obligations laid out by the Court.  
This sheds further light on the far-reaching implications of the standard of review outlined in Bilbaína 
II.194 This case provides a perfect example of what has been defined as an “evidence-based judicial 
reflex”:195 a thorough, quasi-substantive review of the scientific evidence relied upon in the decision-
making process, encroaching on the Commission’s assessment of highly complex technical-scientific 
facts and indirectly constraining its discretionary decision-making power.196 Against this backdrop, 
the Judgment in Bilbaína II epitomises a latent shift away from a procedural review197 of the 
                                                     
189 Opinion, para. 70. 
190 Opinion, para. 94. 
191 Ibid. However, and as explained in section 4.2., the Commission did not fail to procedurally take this element into 
account in its reasoning; rather, the ECHA’s decision to resort to the summation method and the Commission’s deliberate 
choice to rely on its results built on the acknowledgment that, in the face of persisting scientific uncertainty over the 
behaviour of CTPHT’s single components, the data on the low solubility of the substance as a whole should have not been 
given any weight. 
192 Indeed, the data underpinning the Commission’s precautionary classification resulted from the prudential decision to 
resort to the summation method – whose application postulates that the overall solubility of the substance should not be 
taken into account. 
193 See supra, section 4.3. and particularly notes 170 and 171. 
194 More specifically, on the implications of the – peculiar – framing and interpretation of the Commission’s duty to take “all 
relevant factors” into account, as outlined in this case. 
195 For a definition and a positive view see Alemanno, “The Emergence of the Evidence-Based Judicial Reflex. A Response 
to Bar-Siman-Tov’s Semi-Procedural Review”, 1 Theory and Practice of Legislation (2013) 1. 
196 This runs against settled case law on the broad discretion of the Commission in cases involving complex technical-
scientific evaluations; see supra, notes 102, 103 and 104. 
197 Of the Commission’s application of the summation method, to assess whether it took “all relevant factors” into 
consideration – see supra, sub-section 4.1. 
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Commission’s duty of good administration, to a substantive review198 of the Commission’s duty to 
adhere to an evidence-based model of risk regulation. Indeed, the development of an “evidence-based 
judicial reflex” paves the way for the entrenchment of evidence-based risk regulation, to the direct 
detriment of a precautionary approach; it is not a case that the advocates of evidence-based risk 
regulation in the EU have consistently called for a more thorough substantive review of the scientific 
evidence triggering the enactment of precautionary measures199 and substantiating the level of 
protection which is deemed to be appropriate by the risk manager.200  
Is there more to the Courts’ decision in this case? Did any other factors play a specific role in this 
case? As the Court of Justice expressly noted in its Judgment, “trade in substances and mixtures is an 
issue relating not only to the internal market, but also to the global market, [and] enterprises should 
benefit from the global harmonisation of rules”:201 the Union “confirmed its intention to contribute to 
the global harmonisation of criteria for classification and labelling, not only at UN level, but also 
through the incorporation of the internationally agreed GHS criteria into [EU] law”, and “should be at 
the forefront of this process to encourage other countries to follow and with the aim of providing a 
competitive advantage to industry in the Community”.202 The direct link between evidence-based risk 
regulation, regulatory convergence, the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade and transnational 
market access undoubtedly had a role to play in the specific context of – the CLP regulation and – 
Bilbaína II. Regardless of whether this trend is positively or negatively appraised, it still needs to be 
confronted in analytical terms. This makes it all the more important to explore the direct and indirect 
impact of the CJEU’s case law and to spell out that, as occurred in Bilbaína II, an allegedly 
procedural review is liable to have far-reaching substantive implications for EU risk regulation. 
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